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Would you plug into the experience machine? It depends where you start

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The idea

In Anarchy, State, and Utopia (1974), the philosopher Robert Nozick asked readers to imagine a machine that could give them any experiences they wanted. Neuroscientists would stimulate your brain so that you thought you were writing a great novel or making a friend, while in fact you floated in a tank. Would you plug in for life?

Nozick expected most people to say no, and drew a conclusion: if we refuse, then something matters to us beyond how our lives feel from the inside. We want to actually do things, to be a certain kind of person, and to live in contact with reality. The thought experimentthought experiment An imagined scenario used to test an idea by asking what we would judge or expect if it were real. became one of the standard objections to hedonism, the view that well-being consists only of pleasant experience, and to wider theories that treat well-being as purely a matter of mental states.

The argument depends on an empirical premise: that people really do reject the machine, and reject it for the reason Nozick gave. In 2010 the philosopher Felipe De Brigard tested that premise by turning the scenario around. Participants were told to imagine that they had been plugged into an experience machine all along, and were now offered the chance to go back to their real life. If people value reality as such, most should leave.

Why it might change a decision

The status quo biasstatus quo bias A tendency to prefer the current state of affairs over a change, even when the alternative is no worse. account makes a specific prediction: the share of people who choose the machine should rise or fall depending on which life they are told they already have, even when the pleasures on offer stay the same. A Nozick-style preference for reality predicts that people should choose reality in roughly the same numbers whichever way round the question is posed. That gives a testable contrast, and it bears on how much weight a philosopher can put on a single survey of intuitions when choosing between theories of well-being.

How solid is this?

The central finding comes from one small study, though a later replicationreplication Running a study again, independently, to see whether the original result holds up. project lists it as reproduced. De Brigard surveyed 72 undergraduates at the University of North Carolina with no prior philosophy training, 24 in each of three conditions, each reading one version of the story. When told nothing about their real life, 54% chose to return to reality. When told their real life was that of a prisoner in a maximum-security prison, 13% chose to return. When told they were really a multimillionaire artist living in Monaco, 50% did. A second group of 80 students read a version that described life outside the machine as unlike anything they had lived; 59% chose to stay connected.

De Brigard’s interpretation was that people are reluctant to abandon the life they have been living, whether it is virtual or real, which fits the status quo bias described in behavioural economics. If the same bias explains reactions to Nozick’s original, the original intuition is weak evidence that people value reality. He also reported that only about a third of those who chose to disconnect in the second study gave a preference for reality as their reason.

There are limits. The samples are small and drawn from one university’s students, and a single vignettevignette A short written story given to participants in a study, who are then asked to make a judgement about it. per person leaves the wording doing a lot of work. The positive condition is also odd for the status quo story: a dream life in Monaco did not pull more people out than the neutral version did, which suggests other factors, such as attachment to known relationships, are involved. On the other hand, the Experimental Philosophyexperimental philosophy The use of surveys and experiments to study how people respond to questions that philosophers argue about. Replicability Project (Cova and colleagues), which re-ran 40 published studies and reported success about 70% of the time, is listed in the FORRT replication database as having replicated this one.

Dan Weijers, in 2014, accepted that status quo bias and other irrelevant factors distort the classic scenario, but argued that De Brigard’s reversed version shares similar distortions. He ran several experiments to design a scenario with fewer of them. His conclusion was modest: the new scenario should be preferred for testing mental state theories of well-being, and it gives no strong evidence for or against them.

Frank Hindriks and Igor Douven (2018) took a different approach, comparing the machine with less exotic options: a pill that produces pleasant experiences and a pill that improves overall functioning. Their point was that the strangeness of the machine itself, not just its unreality, may drive refusals.

The strongest competing explanation for the whole pattern is that people’s answers mix several things: distrust of the technology, worry about family left behind, and simple discomfort with a bizarre scenario. Studies that remove one confound tend to leave others in place. The popular summary, that experiments have shown Nozick was wrong, outruns the data. What the evidence supports is narrower: refusal to plug in is not clean evidence of a preference for reality.

Sources

  • Nozick, R. (1974). Anarchy, State, and Utopia. New York: Basic Books. (Experience machine discussed around p. 44.)
  • De Brigard, F. (2010). If you like it, does it matter if it’s real? Philosophical Psychology, 23(1), 43-57. doi:10.1080/09515080903532290
  • Weijers, D. (2014). Nozick’s experience machine is dead, long live the experience machine! Philosophical Psychology, 27(4), 513-535. doi:10.1080/09515089.2012.757889
  • Hindriks, F., & Douven, I. (2018). Nozick’s experience machine: An empirical study. Philosophical Psychology, 31(2), 278-298. doi:10.1080/09515089.2017.1406600
  • Cova, F., et al. (2021). Estimating the reproducibility of experimental philosophy. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 12(1), 9-44. doi:10.1007/s13164-018-0400-9

Check yourself

Answers are checked in your browser. Nothing is recorded or sent anywhere.

  1. In De Brigard's main study, participants were told they were already in an experience machine. What happened when their 'real' life was described as a prisoner's?

  2. What does a status quo bias explanation predict about the classic experience machine?

  3. What did Weijers (2014) conclude about his redesigned, less biased scenario?

  4. Which is the fairest description of the evidence behind De Brigard's result?

Questions without answers

  1. If the reversed scenario shows status quo bias, could the original scenario still show a genuine preference for reality as well? What kind of study would separate the two?
  2. Many people spend hours each day in games, social feeds or fiction. Does that behaviour tell us anything about the experience machine question, or is it too different to count?

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